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Abstract 
Empirical evidence, e.g. observed likelihood ratio, is an estimator of the difference of the divergences 
between two competing models (or, model sets) and the true generating mechanism. It is unclear how 
to use such empirical evidence in scientific practice. Scientists usually want to know `how often 
would I get this level of evidence’. The answer to this question depends on the true generating 
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mechanism along with the models under consideration. In many situations, having observed the data, 
we can approximate the true generating mechanism non-parametrically by assuming far less structure 
than the parametric models being compared. We use a resampling method based on the non-
parametric estimate of the true generating mechanism to estimate a confidence interval for the 
empirical evidence that is robust to model misspecification. Such a confidence interval tells us how 
variable the empirical evidence would be if the experiment (or observational study) were to be 
replicated. In our simulations, variability in empirical evidence appears to be substantial and hence 
using empirical evidence without a measure of uncertainty is, in fact, treacherous in practice. We 
divide the decision space in six different categories: Strong and secure(SS), Strong but insecure(SI), 
Weak and secure(WS), Weak and insecure(WI), Misleading and insecure(MI) and Misleading and 
secure (MS) based on the confidence interval. We illustrate the use of these categories for model 
selection in the context of regression. We show that instead of the three categories: Strong, Weak and 
Misleading, as suggested by Royall (1997), the six categories decision process leads to smaller errors 
in model selection and hence in scientific conclusions.  
 
1 Introduction: 
 
In one of the most influential scientific papers of the 20th century, Neyman and Pearson (1933) 
developed a decision procedure to choose between two competing hypotheses about how the data 
were generated. Any such decision, inevitably, leads to errors. In the Neyman-Pearson (NP) 
formulation, they considered one of the hypotheses as special and called it the null hypothesis. The 
decision procedure they developed was such that the probability of rejecting a null hypothesis, when 
it is true, was fixed a priori at a small value (e.g. to protect from unnecessarily rocking the status quo) 
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and the probability of rejecting the alternative hypothesis, when it is true, was minimized. These 
errors are commonly called the Type I error and Type II error. As a consequence of fixing the Type I 
error a priori, the cut-off point at which the null hypothesis is rejected increases as a function of the 
sample size, thus making rejecting the null hypothesis harder and harder to reject. It also implies that 
no matter how large a sample size is, the probability of making an error does not converge to 0. This 
seems wrong scientifically; as we have more information, the probabilities of making wrong 
decisions should go to zero.  
Royall (1997), following Barnard (1949), Birnbaum (1962), Hacking (1965), Edwards (1972) and, of 
course, Fisher (1922), quantified strength of evidence for comparing two simple models using the 
likelihood ratio (LR).  
We represent one observation as the random variable X   with ( )g x  being the probability density 
function representing the true, data-generating process and ( )f x  being the probability density 
function of an approximating model. The likelihood function under the generating process, for n  
independent and identically distributed (iid) observations 1 2, , ..., nx x x  is given as
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 .g nL g x g x g x=    Whereas, the likelihood under an approximating model it is 
( ) ( ) ( )1 2 .f nL f x f x f x=    When there are multiple approximating models (e.g. ( )1f x   and ( )2f x ), 
we write the likelihoods as 1L  and 2L  (see Dennis et al. submitted). The LR is 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
1 1 1 2 11
2 2 1 2 2 2
.n
n
f x f x f xLLR
L f x f x f x
= =


 
Notice that the NP formulation also uses the LR to make decisions. However, there is a crucial 
difference between the NP approach and Royall’s approach. In the NP approach (e.g. Casella and 
Berger, 2002), the cut-off point, the value of the LR, beyond which the null hypothesis is rejected, is 
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determined based on the control of the error probabilities. On the contrary, Royall chooses the cut-off 
point, denoted by k, a priori. If the LR is larger than k, it is considered strong evidence for 2f ; if it is 
smaller than 1/k, it is considered strong evidence for 1f  and if it is between 1/k and k, it is considered 
weak evidence, indicating evidence is insufficient to distinguish the two models. This leads to 
possible errors. For example, suppose 1f  is the true model but we observe 1LR k< , thus leading us 
to conclude that there is strong evidence for 2f . This is called strong misleading evidence. For a full 
description of different errors and their probabilities, see e.g. Dennis et al. ( submitted). In general, 
we would like to have these error probabilities small. Royall (1997, 2000) calculates various error 
probabilities and their global upper bounds, asymptotic expressions etc. for this fixed cut-off point. In 
contrast to the NP approach, the error probabilities converge to 0 as the sample size increases (Royall 
2000, his figure 2). However, similar to the NP approach, these error probabilities are properties of 
the procedure. According to Royall (1997), these error probabilities are useful pre-data and only for 
designing an experiment. Post-data, these error probabilities do not have any meaning (although see a 
somewhat contradictory statement in Royall 2004 page 124). One could speculate as to Royall’s 
reasons for this assertion, but Royall was never explicit in print. We have shown theoretically 
(Dennis et al. submitted) that when the true generating process is not in the set of models being 
compared (i.e. there is model misspecification) then the LR evidence does not contain all of 
information on the probability of errors—not even as a transformation (see Sellke et al., 2001).  We 
are not the first to notice this lacuna, in fact, it was the failure of the evidential approach to include 
measures of confidence that led Birnbaum, an early (1962) strong supporter of the evidential concept 
to later strongly reject it (1970, 1972). The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate one practical 
method of inserting the concept of confidence into evidential analysis. 
Lele (2004) considered a wider class of functions than LR that may quantify the strength of evidence. 
He called it the class of evidence functions.  Broadly speaking, evidence functions are to the LR as 
   The Merits of Bootstrapping Evidence  
 
5 
generalized likelihood ratio tests are to likelihood ratio tests.  While the LR is constrained to 
representing evidence comparing simple models (i.e. models with pre-specified parameters), 
evidence functions can compare models where parameters need to be estimated and even for more 
general composite hypotheses.  Evidence functions are monotonic functions of the difference 
between data based estimates of the statistical divergences between each of two models and the true 
generating process.  Evidence functions are required to meet a number of desiderata designed to 
strengthen their inferential properties.  Lists of these desiderata can be found in Taper and Ponciano 
(2016), Jerde et al. (submitted), Taper and Lele (2011) and Lele (2004).  The LR and consistent 
information criteria are particular cases of evidence functions where the statistical divergence is the 
Kullback-Leibler divergence (see Taper and Ponciano (2016) and Dennis et al. submitted).  
Throughout the above discussion and derivation of different properties of evidence functions, it is 
assumed that the true data generating process is in the model set. However, it is well known that all 
models are only an approximation to the true data generating mechanism. Dennis et al. (submitted) 
explore the effects on the various error probabilities when the true data generating mechanism is 
outside the model set. They call it an evidential approach under model mis-specification.  
Of course, it is common practice in applied fields to test for model misspecification (e.g. Cook and 
Weisberg 1982 for regression diagnostics). An alternative approach is to make inferences that are 
robust to model mis-specification. It is obvious that given the data, not only one can compute the LR 
but also obtain a non-parametric estimate of the data generating mechanism. The non-parametric 
estimator of the true data generating mechanism is still only an approximation to the true data 
generating mechanism because it still depends on some assumptions, but it is just a little bit more 
flexible than fully parametric models in the model set. Moreover, as the sample size increases, the 
model space for the non-parametric estimator also widens, making it a good proxy for the true data 
generating mechanism. An earlier paper by Taper and Lele (2011) made a suggestion of looking at 
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the empirical evidence, the observed likelihood ratio, as an estimator of the true difference between 
the KL divergences between the two models and the data generating mechanism. They, then, suggest 
using non-parametric bootstrap to obtain confidence intervals for the strength of evidence. Our goal 
in this paper is to use such non-parametric estimator of the true data generating mechanism to make 
evidential model selection decisions that are robust against model mis-specifiction. 
In the next section, we outline the bootstrap methodology to obtain a confidence interval for the 
strength of evidence. More importantly, we show how to interpret and use this confidence interval for 
making model selection decisions. In section 3, we present the simulation set up that we use to 
illustrate the ideas about utilizing the confidence intervals. In section 4, we discuss the results of the 
simulation study. Section 5 presents some general comments along with a discussion of pre- vs post- 
data uncertainty quantification in the context of bootstrap confidence intervals for the strength of 
evidence.  
 
2 Confidence interval for the true strength of evidence 
2.1 Defining the “true strength of evidence” 
Quantification of the strength of evidence for one hypothesis vis-à-vis an alternative is an inferential 
statement. An inferential statement becomes a “statistical” inferential statement only when one 
quantifies uncertainty associated with it (Cox 1958, Lele submited). There are different ways to 
quantify uncertainty. One based on aleatory probability (also known as frequentist probability) as 
proposed by Neyman (1937) used in the Classical frequentist inference and the other based on credal 
probability (also known by the names subjective, inductive, and epistemic probability) as practiced 
by the Bayesian inference. In the following, we propose to use the aleatory probability in the 
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Classical frequentist sense: If the experiment is replicated, what could be the different values of the 
strength of evidence? This immediately raises the question of conditionality and which experiment is 
being replicated as is described in Lele (submitted). One could potentially use the Bayesian approach, 
select a prior distribution on the strength of evidence and obtain a credible interval. In that case, one 
has to answer the question: Which prior distribution? The choice is difficult and hence is termed 
‘Sophie’s choice’ by Lele (submitted). We, as scientists, are more comfortable in answering the 
question which experiment could potentially be replicated by the skeptics and hence we use the 
aleatory probability in the following.  
Let us consider a simple situation of an experiment with independent, identically distributed random 
variables. Suppose there are two competing models that purportedly generated the data, with a 
potential for neither of them being true. Given a sample of size n, we can quantify the strength of 
evidence for one model vis-à-vis the alternative by using the likelihood ratio. The log of this 
observed likelihood ratio is an estimate of n times the difference of the Kullback-Leibler divergence 
of one model from the generating process and the Kullback-Leibler divergence of another from the 
generating process (see Taper, 2004; Dennis et al. submitted).  
We denote by K∆  the difference of the KL divergences of ( )1f x  or ( )2f x , from ( )g x : 
 ( ) ( )1,2 2 1, , .K K g f K g f∆ = −    
 We will call 1,2n K⋅∆  the “true strength of evidence” for model 1 over model 2.  We will refer to the 
model in the divergence being subtracted as the reference model and to the model in the divergence 
subtracted from as the alternative model.  If the reference model is closer to the generating process 
than is the alternative model, the “true strength of evidence” will be positive. And, on the other hand, 
if the reference model is farther from the generating process than is the alternative model, the “true 
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strength of evidence” will be negative. We will sometimes refer to the “true strength of evidence” as 
the expected evidence. 
2.2 Variability in observed evidence 
One problem facing the use of observed evidence, i.e. evidence calculated from a realized data set, in 
scientific inference is that evidence is highly variable.  Evidence is a sum, and its expectation and 
variance grow linearly with sample size. However, as the standard deviation of evidence only grows 
as root n, inferences do become more secure as sample sizes increase (Dennis et al. submitted).  (see 
Figure 1: Convergence simulated distributions of evidence at sample sizes 20, 200, 2,000, 20,000).   
 <Figure 1 near here> 
Clearly as the sample size increases, one gets relatively closer and closer to the true strength of 
evidence, at least when the models have no unknown parameters. For composite hypothesis case, 
where we need to estimate the parameters in the models, we need to adjust this by using a consistent 
information criterion such as the SIC. For the discussion below, we will use the simpler case of no 
unknown parameters.  
Because of its variability, the reliability of evidence does need to be quantified.  Reliability, as a pre-
data or global quantity R*, is the probability that an experiment or survey will yield evidence that 
correctly identifies the best model.  Post-data we will be interested in our confidence that the 
observed data has yielded evidence that correctly identifies the best model. We will term this post-
data confidence as local reliability and designate it as RL. This then is the question we want to 
address is: How uncertain is the estimate of the strength of evidence?  
2.3 Non-parametric bootstrap confidence intervals for the true strength of evidence 
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A simple way to answer the uncertainty question is by using non-parametric bootstrap confidence 
interval for this statistics. In the i.i.d. situation, one can estimate the true data generating mechanism 
by using the empirical distribution function of the sampled values. By repeatedly sampling from the 
empirical distribution function, we can mimic repeated sampling from the true data generating 
mechanism. The basic procedure is well known in statistics (Efron and Tibshirani 1993).  
However, as was noticed by Hall (1987) that percentile bootstrap confidence interval does not always 
have good coverage properties, particularly when the generating process is highly non-normal. To 
obtain better coverage properties, he developed what is known as a calibrated bootstrap (Efron and 
Tibshirani 1993, chapter 18).  We describe these algorithms in more detail below.   The basic idea is 
bootstrap the bootstrapped data set and based on the coverage properties of the lower level bootstraps 
adjust the limits of the upper level bootstrap.  
Let us assume, for the time being, that we can obtain confidence interval for the true strength of 
evidence. It is a confidence interval because the true strength of evidence is a real number defined 
independently of the data. How should we interpret and use such confidence intervals? 
2.4 Inferential use of confidence intervals for expected evidence  
2.4.1 Desirable properties for confidence intervals for expected evidence 
From an a priori design viewpoint an interval can either cover the expected evidence or it can miss it.  
If the interval fails to cover the expected evidence, it can either be entirely above the expectation 
(miss high) or entirely below it (miss low) (see Figure 2). Generally, the primary desirable property 
of a confidence interval is that the proportion of times the intervals contain their target true value (its 
coverage probability) is close to a priori nominal level. A secondary desirable property is that, given 
reasonable coverage, the intervals be as short as possible.  Finally, it is often, but not always, it is 
considered desirable if intervals that miss the target value are distributed equally above and below it.   
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Evidence is one of the cases where an equal distribution of error is not desirable.  In this context 
missing high is superior to missing low.  Both types of intervals misrepresent the confidence one 
should have in the evidence, but the high miss is at least always indicating a correct decision, while a 
low miss could be supporting an incorrect decision.  Of course, this is assuming that the expected 
evidence is positive, as in Figure 2, if the expected evidence were negative, the desirability of 
missing high and low would be reversed.  Really, we mean that it is better to miss distally from 0 
than to miss proximally to 0.  However, in this simulation study the evidential comparisons are 
arranged so that reference model is always the better model, and the language of missing high and 
low seems less confusing. 
<Figure 2 near here> 
2.4.2 The use of bootstrap evidence intervals to aid post-data inference. 
2.4.2.1 Defining evidential categories 
As described in our introduction, Royall (1997) divided evidence into three categories: Strong, Weak 
and Misleading.  These categories were based strictly on the observed evidence. Using both the 
observed evidence and the confidence interval as a measure of the evidential uncertainty, we divide 
the decision space in six different categories: Strong and secure (SS), Strong but insecure (SI), Weak 
and secure (WS), Weak and insecure (WI), Misleading and insecure (MI) and Misleading and secure 
(MS) based on the confidence interval. We define the evidence for one model over another given the 
data as strong and secure if the observed evidence is greater  than a strong evidence threshold, and 
the proximal confidence bound is greater than a marginal evidence threshold.  Strong and insecure 
evidence occurs when the observed evidence is greater than the strong evidence threshold and the 
proximal confidence bound is less than the marginal evidence threshold.  Weak but secure evidence 
occurs when the observed evidence is less than the strong evidence threshold but the proximal 
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confidence bound is greater than the marginal evidence threshold.  The misleading and insecure and 
misleading and secure evidence categories are the same as the strong and insecure and strong and 
secure categories with the all-important difference that the model identification is not correct.  
2.4.2.2 Interpreting evidence with intervals post-data  
Figure 3 depicts some possible confidence intervals for the expected evidence.  We will discuss how 
one might interpret each. We have adopted the convention that , 7r cSIC∆ ≥  is required for strong 
evidence for the reference model over an alternative model. , 4r cSIC∆ =  is the threshold for marginal 
evidence (see Jerde et al. submitted for discussion of the interpretation of thresholds).   
In interval 1, the observed evidence, indicated by the filled oval, is strong and the lower bound for 
the bootstrapped evidence is above the marginal level.  This evidence is designated strong and 
secure—the reference model is strongly indicated as being closer to the generating process than is the 
alternative and there is little chance that sampling variation would upset this identification.  The 
research may reasonably conclude that no further work is needed regarding this particular contrast.  
In interval 2, the observed evidence is strong, but the proximal bound is less than 4. So while the 
reference model is strongly indicated, it is plausible that this is due to sampling variation. Cautious 
interpretation is indicated, and if possible more data should be collected.  Unlike NP tests, there is no 
penalty for looking at the data, so collecting more data is an appropriate response. 
In interval 3 the evidence is both weak and insecure.  The models are not differentiated by the data.  
The primary decision that the research should make is that more data are needed.    
Interval 4 is a reflection of interval 2.  The evidence is strong but insecure.   In this case, the evidence 
is misleading, but a researcher with real data would not know this. The researcher can avoid errors by 
heading the insecure caveat both by cautious interpretation and by seeking more data. 
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Interval 5 is a researcher’s worst case.  The evidence is strong, secure and misleading.  The 
researcher should try to avoid this situation both by experimental design (large sample size) and by 
analytic design (higher strong and marginal evidence thresholds). 
The bounds for interval 6 range from strong evidence for the reference model to strong evidence for 
the alternative model.  This indicates that both models probably have fairly similar divergences from 
the generating process but are quite different from one another.   
For interval 7, the evidence is weak, and the interval length is short. The most likely cause for this 
configuration is that the two models both have fairly similar distances to the generating process and 
are fairly similar to one another.  In both cases 6 and 7 considerably more data will likely be needed 
to resolve the situation. 
As sample sizes increases towards infinity, the asymptotic mathematics of Dennis et al. (submitted) 
applies and the probability of any interval other than strong secure (and correct) goes to 0.  There is, 
of course, the pathological case where two models are exactly equidivergent from the true generating 
process. Were this curiosity ever to occur, then each model would be strongly and secure selected 
with a probability of 0.5.  It is arguable that, even then, no error has occurred, as in each case a model 
closest to the generating process has been selected.  
In the next section, we use simulations to show how confidence interval for the strength of evidence 
be used to conduct model selection for regression models.  
 
3 Research Plan 
3.1 Simple modeling scenario 
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To examine the uncertainty in evidential assessments and the potential impacts of model 
misspecification on that uncertainty we need a modeling test bed.  This test bed should be simple so 
as not to distract from the important demonstrations with statistical pyrotechnics.  To further enhance 
accessibility, the test bed should be broadly familiar.   
We have chosen a multiple linear regression of a response variable, R, against five predictor 
variables, (U, V, W, X, Y) and a quadratic effect Q.  
 0i U i V i W i X i Y i Q i iR U V W X Y Qβ β β β β β β ε= + + + + + + +   
Where 0β is an intercept, the other β  are the regression coefficients for the corresponding variables. 
Finally, iε is an error term. U and V  are spurious covariates, by which we mean covariates without causal 
connections to the response variable or to any of the other predictor variables—any correlations are purely 
chance.  W is a weak covariate, X andY are strong covariates, and Q is a quadratic curvature for Y . 
This, perhaps odd, notation for predictor variables allows us to designate models in a simple yet 
heuristic fashion.  If a variable is in a model then it is indicated by including the variables letter in the 
name.  A variables absence from a model is highlighted with an underscored blank space. UVWXYQ 
indicates the saturated model, __WXYQ indicates the generating model, and __WXY_ indicates a 
model with neither of the spurious covariates or the curvature term. 
    <Table 1 about here> 
3.2 Evidence functions  
The general notation we use for evidence functions is Ev(d,m1,m2) this is to be read as the evidence 
for model m1 over model m2 based on data d.  Including data in the notation serves as a reminder 
that evidence always depends on specific data. The d may be suppressed for compactness if it is clear 
what data are being used. 
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The evidence function used in this study for comparing model m1 to model m2 is the difference of 
Schwarz’ information criterion values: ( )1, 2SIC m m∆  (Schwarz, 1978). This is our default evidence 
function for general scientific work because of its tendency not to make overfitting errors (Taper 
2004).  There may be good reasons to use other evidence functions for specific purposes (Ferguson et 
al. submitted, Hjort et al. submitted) The SIC evidence function (also known as the BIC) is defined 
as: 
 ( ) ( )( ) ( )2 1( , 1, 2) 2 log ( 2; log ( 1; log( )SIC d m m L m d L m d n k k∆ = − + − ,  
where ( ),L m d is the maximized likelihood function, k1 and k2 are the number of estimated parameters 
including error terms and other variance components. When we speak of evidence in general, or of potential 
comparisons, we use the Ev(,) notation.  When we report estimated values we use ( ),SIC∆   . 
3.3 Evidential comparisons to be studied. 
There are of a great number of potential comparisons that could be made given this regression 
framework.  We focused on small that we expected to be informative.   
3.3.1 Evidence under correct specification 
A model set without misspecification is one that include the generating process, at least as a model 
form.  We still consider it a correct specification if the parameters of the generating model form need 
to be estimated. In this study the generating model had the form __WXYQ. 
The ability of evidence to detect spurious covariates is of interest for several reasons. First, the 
presence spurious covariates in models will confuse scientific interpretation.  Second, the presence of 
spurious covariates will degrade the precision with which real parameters of interest can be 
estimated.  Third, as discussed in Dennis et al. (submitted) the classical theory of loglikelihood ratios 
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(Neyman and Pearson, 1933; Wilks, 1938; Wald, 1943) indicates that evidence comparing the 
generating model and a model augmented with spurious covariates should have an inverted shifted 
chi-square distribution.  Such skewed distributions may generate ambiguous evidential results.  We 
analyze evidence under correct specification for two models including spurious covariates: 
Ev(__WXYQ: U_WXYQ) and Ev(__WXYQ: UVWXYQ). 
The SIC with its strong complexity penalty is known to be prejudiced against detecting weak effects 
at low sample size.  It is of interest to compare the behavior of evidence for models with weak effect 
with that for spurious effect. We consider the evidential comparison: Ev(__WXYQ: ___XYQ).  We 
also study the evidential comparison Ev(__WXYQ: __WXY_) to see if there is anything anomalous 
about the ability of evidence to detect curvature. Finally, for comparative purposes we include the 
evidential detection of strong effects with comparison: Ev(__WXYQ: __W_YQ). 
3.3.2 Evidence under misspecification 
We investigate the impact of misspecification on evidential assessment with problems of detecting 
weak effects and of detecting curvature.  For each problem evidence is evaluated using model sets 
that contain several kinds of misspecification.  Evidence for the weak effect is sought in comparing 
models with the inclusion of two spurious covariates, Ev(UVWXYQ: UV_XYQ); in models that are 
missing the quadratic curvature element, Ev(__WXY_: ___XY_); and in models that both include the 
spurious covariates and miss the curvature term, Ev(UVWXY_: UV_XY_).  Similarly, for detecting 
curvature we compare models with added spurious covariates, Ev(UVWXYQ: UVWXY_); with a 
missing weak effect, Ev(___XYQ: ___XY_), and with both misspecifications, Ev(UV_XYQ: 
UV_XY_). 
3.4 Bootstrapping Methodology 
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As mentioned above, this is a difficult bootstrapping scenario.  We expect both symmetric and highly 
skewed distributions of the evidence statistic. Depending on the kinds of misspecifications the 
distributions are expected to be chi-square, non-central chi-square, normal, or some mixture of these 
distributions (Dennis et al., submitted).  To navigate this landscape we use the calibrated bootstrap.  
This is a flexible after the data adjustment for different distributions. The technique was first 
proposed by Peter Hall (1986, 1987) and is described Efron and Tibshirani (1993).  The calibrated 
bootstrap is a double level bootstrap that uses coverage of the observed statistic by second level 
bootstrap to adjust quantiles of 1st level bootstrap to achieve desired coverage. When bootstrapping, 
rows of data, response and covariates are sampled as units. 
Given an observed data set, ox  where the boldface indicating a vector (or matrix), with and estimated 
statistic(s) of interest, oˆθ , the basic algorithm to obtain percentile bootstrap confidence intervals for 
any statistics is (See Efron and Tibshirani 1993 page170) as follows:, 1) Randomly resample, with 
replacement the data set B times to create B bootstrap data sets, { }( )1..i i in Bx ,the subscript i 
indicates the ith of B data sets, . 2) For each data set calculate the statistic(s) of interest iˆθ . 3) Order 
the bootstrap estimates and use the confidence points, the 100 α⋅   and the  ( )100 1 α− percentiles, as 
the limits for a ( )1 2α−  per cent interval. In this study, our targeted statistic of interest, θˆ ,  is 
( ),SIC∆   . 
We implement the calibrated bootstrap as follows: 1) Randomly resample, with replacement the data 
set B1 times to create B1 first level bootstrap data sets, ix . 2) For each data set calculate the statistic(s) 
of interest iˆθ . 3) For each first level bootstrap, randomly resample, with replacement, the first level 
data set, ix , B2 times to create B2 second level bootstrap data sets, { } { }( )1in 1.. and in 1..ij ji B j Bx . 4)  
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Calculate and order within each first level bootstrap, the estimated second level iˆjθ . For a grid of Lλ
confidence points (say { }0.01,0.02, ,0.5L inλ  ) calculate 100 Lλ⋅ lower bounds for each of the B first 
level bootstraps. Select as *Lλ the Lλ whose B lower bounds most closely cover the observed oˆθ  at the 
desired 100 α⋅ level. 5) Repeat step 4 to for upper bounds to find *Uλ  whose B lower bounds most 
closely cover the observed oˆθ  at the desired ( )100 1 α⋅ − level. 6) Order the first level bootstrap 
estimates, iˆθ , and use the 
*100 Lλ⋅   and the  ( )*100 1 Uλ− percentiles as the limits for a ( )1 2α−  per cent 
calibrated interval. 
The use of the bootstrap gives the researcher access to information useful in making evidential 
inferences.  The first level bootstrap yields an estimate of the sampling variability for the evidence, 
quantiles of the sampling distribution evidence, and an estimate of the local, or post data, reliability 
of the evidential assessment. The second level bootstrap makes possible a calibration of the quantiles 
for the sampling distribution of evidence and confidence bounds for the estimate of R*. 
3.5 Testing the procedures 
To ascertain whether our proposed protocols are useful we analyze the results of their application to 
simulated data. We generated data sets with 4 different sizes: Tiny, n=20, no reasonable scientist 
would consider this adequate for a regression with 6 covariates. Small, n=50, many rules of thumb 
indicate this is a reasonable sample size. Big, n=200, most scientists would be comfortable with this 
sample size. And, huge, n=2000, many scientists would consider this wasted effort. For each data 
size, 100 data sets were generated using the parameters in table 1.  For each data set calibrated 
nonparametric bootstrapping is performed with bootstrap numbers B1=B2=100.  
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The quality of the calibrated estimators can be determined by comparison with god's eye truth.  The 
expected evidence and global reliability were estimated from 100,000 simulated data sets. Estimators 
are compared for MSE and bias. 
We ask which estimator of evidence is best. We compare the observed evidence, the mean of 1st level 
bootstrapped evidence estimate, and the median of 1st level bootstrapped evidence estimates.  We 
also briefly considered the 50th quantile of 1st level BCa bootstrap (Efron, 1987, Efron and Tibshrani, 
1993) and 50th quantile of calibrated bootstrap.  Neither estimator was pursued because initial work 
indicated that these last two estimators performed more poorly than the other three. 
We investigate the adequacy of the bootstrap intervals of evidence. For the 1st level bootstrap 
percentiles and the calibrated bounds, we tabulate their coverage, interval length, and the proportion 
of times that the intervals fall entirely above and entirely below the expected evidences.   
Three estimators of R* are compared.  These are the observed RL(1st order bootstrap), the mean RL 
(2nd order bootstrap), and the median RL (2nd order bootstrap). We also look at the coverage of 
bootstrap bounds on R*. 
The R code for the simulations can be found in the file SimulationSingleFile.R.  The R code for 
analyzing the simulations is in the file PostSimulationAnalysis.R.  Both of these programs can be 
found on github (https://github.com/jmponciano/mltaper-bootpaper).  These programs can also 
be found in the supplementary material in the zipped file Rcode.zip. The raw summaries can be 
found in the supplementary figures S1-S108 and in the supplementary tables S1-S32.  All analyses 
were conducted using R version 3.5.1. 
4 Results Summary: 
4.1 Best estimate of the expected evidence 
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The overall best estimator of the expected evidence is the observed evidence. In aggregate the 
differences between estimators are small, however when inspecting the RMSEs by evidential 
comparison a striking pattern emerges.  For all data sizes tested, for evidential comparisons testing 
whether to add spurious covariates to the model, the observed evidence has a substantially lower 
RMSE than the other two estimators. For all other comparisons, the RMSEs are very similar across 
estimators.  
4.2 Quality of evidence quantile estimates 
Both 1st level and calibrated quantiles over cover for evidential comparisons not involving spurious 
covariates. For evidential comparisons involving spurious covariates 1st level quantiles over cover 
and calibrated intervals substantially under cover.  However in these cases, misses for calibrated 
intervals are almost entirely high (see Figure 2:). Calibrated intervals have overall better coverage, 
and interval length is on average smaller for calibrated intervals.  Again this superiority is due to 
behavior in the presence of spurious covariates. Calibrated interval length is many times shorter than 
1st level interval length for evidence against spurious covariates. For evidence not involving spurious 
covariates, calibrated intervals were shorter than uncalibrated intervals for the tiny and small data set 
size, but greater for the big and huge sample sizes. Calibrated interval length is slightly larger than 
1st level interval length  
The best estimate of R* is 2nd level bootstrap median RL. This superior to the 1st level bootstrap 
estimate of RL and also to the mean 2nd level bootstrap RL in both RMSE and bias.  This superiority 
increases with sample size.  Again, the superiority is primarily due to performance with spurious 
covariates. It is important to note that RL is highly variable, but despite this variability the bootstrap 
quantile for RL has good coverage of R*. 
5 Synthesis 
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Inspection of the evidential limits (see figures S1-S108 and tables S1-S4, S9-S12, S17-S20, and S25-
S28) leads to a profound observation: The interval length surrounding misleading evidence tends to 
be greater than for correct evidence. This suggest a way to combine observed evidence with 
estimated bounds or error rates to make honest inferences. 
We suggest a model identification protocol that in our testing makes almost no errors even at very 
low sample size.   A standard evidential analysis divides outcomes into 3 categories, strong evidence 
for model 1, weak or inconclusive evidence, and strong evidence for model 2.  We further subdivide 
strong evidence into the categories of secure strong evidence, and insecure strong evidence.  If the 
evidence is strong and if the bounds for evidence do not overlap an evidential threshold the evidence 
is designated secure. Under secure strong evidence it is highly unlikely that the conclusion is in error 
due to sampling variability. Under insecure strong evidence, an error is more plausible.  The 
fundamental mistake to avoid is accepting strong misleading evidence. (see Figure 5:) In our 
simulations using 90% intervals (5% tails) and threshold of marginal evidence ( 4SIC∆ ≥  secure 
misleading evidence almost never occurs.   
6 Discussion 
In this study secure misleading evidence only occurs twice both at the intermediate sample size of 
200.  No instance of secure misleading evidence occur at tiny, small or huge data sizes.  This is an 
expression of Royall’s bump function (Royall, 2000; Dennis et al. submitted) under model 
misspecification.  We find it remarkable that while there are no cases of secure misleading evidence 
at the tiny data size there are several cases of strong and secure correct evidence.  Apparently, strong 
inferences on model form can be drawn from very small data sets—occasionally, and if the stars align 
(see Figure 1). Note that caution still needs to be used when interpreting small data sets.  Effect size 
estimates are likely to be strongly biased.  
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We have seen that the bootstrap bounds on evidence can be very important in understanding the 
inferences that can be made with the data in hand.  They can also be used to help a research decide if 
it will be profitable to continue collecting data.  It is unlikely that under continued sampling the total 
evidence will fall outside of those bounds.  If no evidence within those bounds, if secure, would 
change your conclusions then continued sampling is not likely to be profitable.  This clear advice on 
the utility of collecting more data is not found in either classical NP tests nor fully in Royall’s 
evidential trichotomy. 
Surprisingly, in this study, model misspecification has had only a minor effect on model selection.  
Dennis et al. (submitted) only indicates that model misspecification can lead to an increased 
probability of misleading evidence.  More careful retrospective consideration of the geometry of 
model misspecification in regression leads us to believe that it is the inclusion of dependence 
relationships among predictor variables (often called collinearity) that will lead to an increase in 
misleading evidence.  As Bollen (1989, p. 59) says: “Collinearity generally increases the standard 
errors of the coefficients of the collinear variables (other things equal). The increased standard errors 
means that we have greater uncertainty in the inferences that we make about the parameters.” We 
expect that this increased uncertainty will translate into increased uncertainty in model selection. In 
subsequent research will expand our analysis to include collinearity and confirm that our protocol 
also improves inferences in these cases.   
In this era, there is a crisis of confidence in science.  The reasons for this are manifold.  But, a portion 
of this lack of confidence in science is due to problems in statistics.  This portion is fixable.  Classical 
statistics relies fundamentally on estimated error rates as its warrant to reliable scientific inference.   
When experiments and observations fail to be replicable at the rates implied by their reported 
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significance levels or test sizes, the foundations of scientific inference are literally1 broken. This is 
the replication crisis facing science today.  We believe that the replication crisis itself, at least in part, 
stems from abuses of classical statistics induced by the deficiencies of classical statistics.    
The work horse of modern ecological statistics is the Neyman-Pearson test. However this test is 
strongly lopsided. The Null hypothesis is either rejected or it is not, but if it is not rejected, this does 
not constitute evidence for the Null.  Papers that fail to reject the Null essentially say nothing, as a 
consequence, reviewers and consequently journals tend to reject papers without “significant” results.  
This by itself creates a selection bias whereby “significant” results are over-represented in the 
literature.  It also creates motivation for researchers to either consciously or unconsciously jigger 
their results to get them over the critical threshold further increasing the selection bias for speciously 
significant results. Second, there is a widespread underappreciation of the potential impact of model 
misspecification on the NP-test. Under model misspecification, the nominal error rate can under 
estimate the true error rate, and sometimes greatly (Dennis et al. submitted).  This creates another 
source of bias towards speciously significant results. 
The error structure of evidence is inherently better for the practice of science. First, you can have 
evidence for either of the two models compared.  Second, having the category of weak evidence 
creates a legitimate means for researchers to discuss suggestive results without the need to overrate 
the strength of evidence implied.  For example, in Jerde et al. (submitted) weak evidence is found for 
a temperature sensitivity in the scaling of metabolic rate with body mass.  A Neyman-Pearson 
analysis would tend to suppress this result by saying that it was not a significant result. In contrast, 
the canonical recommendation in an evidential analysis is that such a model should be retained in the 
                                                 
1 Contrary to common usage, by “literally” we do mean literally and not figuratively.   
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researchers thinking.  In fact, one of the authors of Jerde et al. now plans to pursue this temperature 
sensitivity as part of her dissertation research.    
By breaking the evidential assessment into 6 cases as opposed to 3 we have created the opportunity 
for more honest and yet more nuanced inference.  This division also maintains the separation of 
evidence and error rates as distinct but jointly informative inferential quantities. 
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11 Figures 
 
Figure 1:Convergence of the evidential comparison. Ev(__WXYQ:__WX__) (see section 3.1 for 
model definitions) as sample sizes increases. For each sample size 20 data sets are generated.  Each 
data set is bootstrapped 1000 times, the evidence for the contrast calculated, and kernel density 
estimates of the distribution of the bootstrapped evidence plotted. The heavy dashed line buried in the 
plots is    the distribution of evidence for 20,000 simulated data sets.  Data sizes shown are 20, 200, 
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2,000, and 20,000. Comparison of the four panels demonstrates that while the mean and variance for 
evidence increases with sample size, the coefficient of variation decreases 
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Figure 2: 
Attributes of bootstrap evidence intervals from an a priori design viewpoint.  An interval can either 
cover the expected evidence or it can miss it.  If the interval fails to cover the expected evidence, it 
can either be entirely above the expectation (miss high) or entirely below it (miss low).  In this 
simulation study the reference model is always the better model.  In this context missing high is 
superior to missing low.  Both types of intervals misrepresent the confidence one should have in the 
evidence, but the high miss is at least always indicating a correct decision, while a low miss could be 
supporting an incorrect decision. 
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Figure 3: 
Possible types of evidence confidence intervals to aid post-data inference. We have adopted the 
convention that , 7r cSIC∆ ≥  is required for strong evidence for strong evidence for the reference 
model over a contrasting model. , 4r cSIC∆ = is the threshold for marginal evidence. The dotted lines 
at 7 and -7 demark the strong evidence threshold.  The short dashed lines at 4 and -4 indicate the 
marginal evidence threshold.  The line at 0 indicates completely equivocal evidence.  The dark ovals 
indicate the observed evidence.  Bars show the confidence intervals for expected evidence. The labels 
of SS, SI, WS, WI, MI, and MS indicate strong and secure, strong and insecure, weak and secure, 
weak and insecure, misleading and insecure, and misleading and secure evidence respectively.  
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12 Tables 
 
Variable β

 Definition 
Intercept 1  
U  0 ( )~ 0,1N  
V  0 ( )~ 0,1N  
W  0.25 ( )~ 0,1N  
X  0.5 ( )~ 0,1N  
Y  0.5 ( )~ 0,1N  
Q  -0.15 2
i iQ Y=  
ε  1 ( )~ 0,1N  
Table 1: Predictor variables, coefficients, and definitions 
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